Image description: In a crowded Hong Kong street, a young man holds up a sign that reads ‘stand up for HK!’


By Hayley Shiel-Rood


As the COVID-19 pandemic has dominated the global news cycle, many political issues of significant importance have fallen from public attention. One such issue, of considerable significance for the politics of the Indo-Pacific, is pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. While the COVID-crisis has acted as a short-term deterrent for street demonstrations, China’s handling of the pandemic is simultaneously stoking further opposition to the Hong Kong status quo.


Hong Kong’s History of Protest  

Hong Kong’s recent history has been marred by frequent mass protest. These began in 1997, following the return of territory to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since this time, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has maintained its autonomous region status within the PRC, under the framework of ‘one country, two systems’.


Commencing in 1997, there have been annual protests on July 1 to oppose the establishment of HKSAR. But it was in 2003 that large crowds of protesters began attending the rally, triggered by the proposed introduction of Article 23, which allowed the HKSAR government to enact laws to prohibit acts of sedition or subversion against the state.


Protests continue to be held annually to commemorate the 2003 movement, followed by the very public 2014 ‘Umbrella Revolution’, a movement voicing the continued dissatisfaction towards perceived attempts by the PRC to instil mainland-nationalist ideologies into Hong Kong society.


The PRC has attempted to promulgate a collaborative state-building sense of nationalism, while implementing greater central control over the political, economic, and ideological domains. Unsurprisingly, attempts to successfully assimilate Hong Kong into a unified Chinese nation has catalysed counter-protests. Indeed, they have seen a rise of peripheral nationalism, where citizens of a culturally, ethically or linguistically different periphery resist being incorporated by a centralising state.


Hong Kong’s current position demonstrates its being in the midst of a centre-periphery conflict, with two forms of competing nationalist ideals informing both sides of the conflict. COVID-19 has acted as a catalyst for intensifying the feelings of unrest and discontent, fuelling peripheral nationalism.



COVID-19 Fuelling Tensions

Now one year after the 2019 protests, a very different sense of discontent has emerged. Dissatisfaction towards the PRC’s response to COVID-19 in Hong Kong has resulted in widespread condemnation from citizens.


A recent poll conducted in February 2020 by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) showed government distrust was rated to be at 75.9%.


The PRC’s unwillingness to rapidly shut the border between Hong Kong and the mainland has sparked criticism, with many protesters believing border closures could have more rapidly contained the spread of the virus. As of April 15th 2020, Hong Kong had a reported one thousand and sixteen cases of infection, and four deaths.


The delayed response in implementing safety protocols, particularly for healthcare professionals, was a further cause for concern. In February, more than five thousand public sector health workers carried out a five day strike, organised by the trade union Hospital Authority Employees Alliance.


Other triggers included attempts to convert local clinics into specialised COVID-19 treatment centres, which were strongly opposed due to the clinics being located in close proximity to residential areas.


More violent measures were carried out, with police locating five homemade explosive devices in multiple locations across the city. These sites included the Caritas Medical Centre in Cheung Sha Wan, and aboard a train at Lo Wu station. Numerous petrol bombs have also reportedly been thrown at police stations and patrol cars, demonstrating the continued brewing unrest.


An unexpected development since the outbreak of COVID-19 is the newfound co-operation between pro-Beijing supporters and anti-Beijing protesters. Previously, there has been a clear division between these camps. Yet recent developments have shown that many who previously supported the PRC have shifted their position due to perceived mishandling of the pandemic.


Many who have joined the movement have done so out of newfound opposition due to growing unemployment and fears of socioeconomic repercussions. Other newcomers have included affiliates of pro-Beijing parties, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, and the Federation of Trade Unions. Their shift in association is believed to be fuelled by feeling let down and abandoned by the PRC government.



The Future of Hong Kong Protests

Both the PRC and HKSAR governments have utilised the pause in public protests to crack down on the growing pro-democratic movement, with the arrest of fifteen high-profile activists. These prominent figures include Martin Lee, an eighty-one-year-old barrister, frequently referred to as the “father” of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. Others included barrister Margaret Ng, Jimmy Lai (the founder of Next Media), legislator Leung Yiu-chung, and social activist Leung Kwok-hung.


The charges brought against the group include joining and organising of illegal rallies. These refer to the 2019 protests, which, – ironically, given the age of the arrested activists – mainly involved younger Hong Kongers acting without formal direction.

The arrests may be a means to ensure a pro-PRC majority will be successfully elected in the coming September Legislative Council elections. Since the establishment of the HKSAR in 1997, there has never been an elected pro-democratic majority.


Protesters have already been using the imposed isolation restrictions to regroup and prepare for a second wave of street protests once the threat of COVID-19 has passed. The brain of the movement has shifted online through social media, with the pause in public protests allowing for activists to reorganise and return to the streets once the threat of the pandemic has passed.


This suggests that large protests will soon resume, potentially with an even larger support base. Already this week, a group of more than one hundred people gathered at the International Financial Centre shopping centre, continuing anti-government protests.


Whether protesters will achieve their desired outcome is uncertain. The demands for greater democracy and less mainland intervention suggests the movement will not settle, inciting the slogan “five demands not one less”.


Image courtesy of Shutterstock


This article was originally published on 7th of May by the Perth USAsia Centre

By Pelican Magazine

Pelican Magazine acknowledges the Whadjuk Noongar people as the Traditional Custodians of the land—Whadjuk Boodja—on which we live, write, and work. We pay our respects to Elders past and present. // Pelican is the second-oldest student publication in Australia and the only independent paper at UWA. If you like having opinions, writing, drawing, and/or free tickets to local events, then Pelican is the place for you! We print SIX themed issues a year, and run a stream of online content. // Email your 2024 Editors (Abbey Wheeler and Jack Cross) here: [email protected] // Where to find us: Upstairs in Guild Village. Address: M300, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley 6009 WA // Pelican Magazine of the UWA Student Guild & The University of Western Australia.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *